The important point to grasp from all this is that when Aquinas speaks of self-evident principles of natural law, he does not mean tautologies derived by mere conceptual analysisfor example: Stealing is wrong, where stealing means the unjust taking of anothers property. This is exactly the mistake Suarez makes when he explains natural law as the natural goodness or badness of actions plus preceptive divine law.[70]. 1, c. Those who misunderstand Aquinass theory often seem to assume, as if it were obvious, that law is a transient action of an efficient cause physically moving passive objects; for Aquinas, law always belongs to reason, is never considered an efficient cause, and cannot possibly terminate in motion. [84] G. P. Klubertanz, S.J., The Root of Freedom in St. Thomass Later Works, Gregorianum 42 (1961): 709716, examines how Aquinas relates reason and freedom. This is a directive for action . (Ditchling, 1930), 103155. Aquinass solution to the question is that there are many precepts of the natural law, but that this multitude is not a disorganized aggregation but an orderly whole. In this part of the argument, Nielsen clearly recognizes the distinction between theoretical and practical reason on which I have been insisting. I propose to show how far this interpretation misses Aquinass real position. (S. th. at II.15.2) referring to pursuit subordinates it to the avoidance of evil: Evil is to be avoided and good is to be pursued. Perhaps Suarezs most personal and most characteristic formulation of the primary precept is given where he discusses the scope of natural law. Hence an end for Aquinas has two inseparable aspectswhat is attained and the attainment of it. Purpose in view, then, is a real aspect of the dynamic reality of practical reason, and a necessary condition of reasons being practical. Maritain points out that Aquinas uses the word quasi in referring to the prescriptive conclusions derived from common practical principles. J. Migne, Paris, 18441865), vol. [66] Eternal law is the exemplar of divine wisdom, as directing all actions and movements of created things in their progress toward their end. Any proposition may be called objectively self-evident if its predicate belongs to the intelligibility of its subject. Aquinas holds that reason can derive more definite prescriptions from the basic general precepts.[75]. Sertillanges also tries to understand the principle as if it were a theoretical truth equivalent to an identity statement. The prescription expressed in gerundive form, on the contrary, merely offers rational direction without promoting the execution of the work to which reason directs. 4, d. 33, q. Nature is not natural law; nature is the given from which man develops and from which arise tendencies of ranks corresponding to its distinct strata. The first paragraph implies that only self-evident principles of practical reason belong to natural law; Aquinas is using natural law here in its least extensive sense. [25] See Stevens, op. cit. examines how Aquinas relates reason and freedom. In the fifth paragraph Aquinas enunciates the first principle of practical reason and indicates the way in which other evident precepts of the law of nature are founded on it. 2, ad 2. 1, q. [30] Ibid. He does not accept the dichotomy between mind and material reality that is implicit in the analytic-synthetic distinction. To say that all other principles are based on this principle does not mean that all other principles are derived from it by deduction. Copyright 2023 The Witherspoon Institute. Utilitarianism is an inadequate ethical theory partly because it overly restricts natural inclination, for it assumes that mans sole determinate inclination is in regard to pleasure and pain. For the Independent Journal.. Why, exactly, does Aquinas treat this principle as a basis for the law and yet maintain that there are many self-evident principles corresponding to the various aspects of mans complex nature? 2) Since the mistaken interpretation restricts the meaning of good and evil in the first principle to the value of moral actions, the meaning of these key terms must be clarified in the light of Aquinass theory of final causality. But his alternative is not the deontologism that assigns to moral value and the perfection of intention the status of absolutes. supra note 8, at 202203: The intellect manifests this truth formally, and commands it as true, for its own goodness is seen to consist in a conformity to the natural object and inclination of the will.). Good things don't just happen automatically; they are created because the people of God diligently seek what is good. Having become aware of this basic commandment, man consults his nature to see what is good and what is evil. There his formulation of the principle is specifically moralistic: The upright is to be done and the wrong avoided. 1, c. [29] Lottin, op. [82] The principle of contradiction expresses the definiteness of things, but to be definite is not to be anything. No, he thinks of the subject and the predicate as complementary aspects of a unified knowledge of a single objective dimension of the reality known. I have just said that oxide belongs to the intelligibility of rust. The fourth reason is that, in defining his own professional occupation, Thomas adopted the term sapiens or "wise man." . Aquinas thinks in terms of the end, and obligation is merely one result of the influence of an intelligible end on reasonable action. the primary principle. In neither aspect is the end fundamental. He thinks that this is the guiding principle for all our decision making. See. Thus we see that final causality underlies Aquinass conception of what law is. Rather, Aquinas proceeds on the supposition that meanings derive from things known and that experienced things themselves contain a certain degree of intelligible necessity.[14]. Previously, however, he had given the principle in the formulation: Good is to be done and evil avoided., But there and in a later passage, where he actually mentions, he seems to be repeating received formulae. supra note 21) tries to clarify this point, and does in fact help considerably toward the removal of misinterpretations. Is reason merely an instrument in the service of nature, accepting what nature indicates as good by moving us toward it? That law pertains to reason is a matter of definition for Aquinas; law is an, c. The translation is my own; the paragraphing is added. There is a constant tendency to reduce practical truth to the more familiar theoretical truth and to think of underivability as if it were simply a matter of conceptual identity. He not only omits any mention of end, but he excludes experience from the formation of natural law, so that the precepts of natural law seem to be for William pure intuitions of right and wrong.[31]. The primary precept provides a point of view from which experience is considered. Thus Lottin makes the precept appear as much as possible like a theoretical statement expressing a peculiar aspect of the goodnamely, that it is the sort of thing that demands doing. An intelligibility is all that would be included in the meaning of a word that is used correctly if the things referred to in that use were fully known in all ways relevant to the aspect then signified by the word in question. Finnis - Human Rights. 91, a. If every active principle acts, Let us imagine a teaspoonful of sugar held over a cup of hot coffee. [26] He remarks that the habit of these ends is synderesis, which is the habit of the principles of the natural law. The good in question is God, who altogether transcends human activity. To begin with, Aquinas specifically denies that the ultimate end of man could consist in morally good action. 2, d. 39, q. Rather, it regulates action precisely by applying the principles of natural law. Romans 16:17. 2, a. If every active principle acts on account of an end, so the anthropomorphic argument goes, then it must act for the sake of a goal, just as men do when they act with a purpose in view. And, in fact, tendency toward is more basic than action on account of, for every active principle tends toward what its action will bring about, but not every tending ability goes into action on account of the object of its tendency. cit. Naturalism frequently has explained away evildoing, just as some psychological and sociological theories based on determinism now do. at q. Practical reason prescribes precisely in view of ends. Even in theoretical knowledge, actual understanding and truth are not discovered in experience and extracted from it by a simple process of separation. a. the same as gluttony. Even so accurate a commentator as Stevens introduces the inclination of the will as a ground for the prescriptive force of the first principle. The third argument for the position that natural law has only one precept is drawn from the premises that human reason is one and that law belongs to reason. But to grant this point is not at all to identify the good in question with moral value, for this particular category of value by no means exhausts human goods. Of course, so far as grammar alone is concerned, the gerundive form can be employed to express an imperative. "The good is to be done and pursued and evil is to be avoided" is not very helpful for making actual choices. Of course, I must disagree with Nielsens position that decision makes discourse practical. Achieving good things is a lifelong pursuit. The second was the pleasure of having your desire fulfilled, like a satisfied, full stomach. Only free acceptance makes the precept fully operative. But in reason itself there is a basic principle, and the first principle of practical reason is the ultimate end. To such criticism it is no answer to argue that empiricism makes an unnatural cleavage between facts and values. [47] Hence evil in the first principle of natural law denotes only the actions which definitely disagree with nature, the doing of which is forbidden, and good denotes only the actions whose omission definitely disagrees with nature, the doing of which is commanded. His response, justly famous for showing that his approach to law is intellectualistic rather than voluntaristic, may be summarized as follows. Only free acceptance makes the precept fully operative. The first primary precept is that good is to be pursued and done and evil avoided. This would the case for all humans. Not all outcomes are ones we want or enjoy. Ought requires no special act legitimatizing it; ought rules its own domain by its own authority, an authority legitimate as that of any is. Maritain suggests that natural law does not itself fall within the category of knowledge; he tries to give it a status independent of knowledge so that it can be the object of gradual discovery. Naturalism frequently has explained away evildoing, just as some psychological and sociological theories based on determinism now do. The primary precepts of practical reason, he says, concern the things-to-be-done that practical reason naturally grasps as human goods, and the things-to-be-avoided that are opposed to those goods. 4, d. 33, q. [40], Aquinas, of course, never takes a utilitarian view of the value of moral action. J. Robert Oppenheimer. Happiness and pleasure were the greatest good, according to Epicurus, while pain was bad. Hence the end transcends morality and provides an extrinsic foundation for it. Practical reason has its truth by anticipating the point at which something that is possible through human action will come into conformity with reason, and by directing effort toward that point. T. 1-2, q. Nonprescriptive statements believed to express the divine will also gain added meaning for the believer but do not thereby become practical. The direction of practical reason presupposes possibilities on which reason can get leverage, and such possibilities arise only in reflection upon experience. After observing these two respects in which the mistaken interpretation unduly restricts the scope of the first principle of practical reason, we may note also that this principle as Aquinas understands it is not merely a principle of imperative judgments. His position is: we are capable of thinking for ourselves in the practical domain because we naturally form a set of principles that make possible all of our actions. Aquinass position is not: we conclude that certain kinds of acts should be done because they would satisfy our inclinations or fulfill divine commands. He classified rule by a king (monarchy) and the superior few (aristocracy) as "good" governments. But there are other propositions which are self-evident only to the educated, who understand what the terms of such propositions mean. Correct! 2, d. 39, q. Aquinas, of course, never takes a utilitarian view of the value of moral action. 94, a. [18] S.T. Ibid. Man cannot begin to act as man without law. They ignore the peculiar character of practical truth and they employ an inadequate notion of self-evidence. My main purpose is not to contribute to the history of natural law, but to clarify Aquinass idea of it for current thinking. Gerard Smith, S.J., & Lottie H. Kendzierski. The kits jeopardize people's privacy, physical health, and financial well-being. The second argument reaches the same conclusion by reasoning that since natural law is based upon human nature, it could have many precepts only if the many parts of human nature were represented in it; but in this case even the demands of mans lower nature would have to be reflected in natural law. But the practical mind is unlike the theoretical mind in this way, that the intelligibility and truth of practical knowledge do not attain a dimension of reality already lying beyond the data of experience ready to be grasped through them. They relentlessly pursue what is good and they fight for it. Von den ethischen Prinzipien: Eine Thomasstudie zu S. Th. supra note 8, at 200. Laws are formed by practical reason as principles of the actions it guides just as definitions and premises are formed by theoretical reason as principles of the conclusions it reaches. 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